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1 Introduction
Bucci (2003) studies the impact of competition in the intermediate goods
sector on growth and the sectoral distribution of skills within an R&D based
growth model with human capital accumulation. By combining in the sim-
plest possible way the Lucas (1988) model of human capital accumulation
with the R&D based model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Bucci (2003) shows that the market power has a positive effect on growth.
Among the assumptions used by Bucci (2003) to derive this result is that
there are no difference between the intermediate goods share in final output,
the returns to specialization and the degree of market power of monopolis-
tic competitors. This leads to the natural question whether making such a
difference to the model changes its predictions. In this note, we show that
including this difference into the model developed by Bucci (2003) eliminates
the result mentioned above. Indeed, in this case, the imperfect competition
has no effect on growth.
2 The model
The model developed is based on Bucci (2003).3 The economy is struc-
tured by three sectors : final good sector, intermediate goods sector and
R&D sector. The final output sector produces output that can be used for
consumption using skilled labor and intermediate goods. These are available
in n varieties and are produced by employing only human capital. The R&D
sector creates the blueprints for new varieties of intermediate goods which
are produced by employing skilled labor. These blueprints are sold to the
intermediate goods sector. Unlike the traditional R&D based growth models,
we assume that the supply of human capital may grow over time.
2.1 The final good sector
In this sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The
final good sector produces a composite good Y by using all the jth type of
intermediate goods xj and skilled labor HY .
4 Production is given by :
Y = AH1−λY n
γ−λ( 1
α
−1)
[∫ n
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
, (1)
3We use the notations of Bucci (2003) in order to have a direct comparison with his
model.
4Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
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where α, λ, γ ∈ [0, 1] and A are technological parameters. This production
function allow us to disentangle the degree of market power of monopolistic
competitors in the intermediate sector ( 1
α
− 1), the intermediate goods share
in final output (λ) and the degree of returns from specialization (γ).5 In this
sense, this model is a generalization of Bucci (2003) model.6 If we normalize
to one the price of the final good, the profit of the representative firm is given
by :
piY = AH
1−λ
Y n
γ−λ( 1
α
−1)
[∫ n
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
−
∫ n
0
pjxjdj − wYHY , (2)
where wY is the wage rate in the final good sector and pj is the price of the jth
intermediate good. Under perfect competition in the final output market and
the factor inputs markets, the representative firm chooses intermediate goods
and labor in order to maximize its profit taking prices as given and subject
to its technological constraint. The first order conditions are the followings :
∂piY
∂xj
= λAH1−λY n
γ−λ( 1
α
−1)xα−1j
[∫ n
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
−1
− pj = 0, (3)
∂piY
∂HY
= (1− λ)AH−λY nγ−λ(
1
α
−1)
[∫ n
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
− wY = 0. (4)
Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the jth
intermediate good whereas equation (4) characterizes the demand function
of skilled labor.
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic com-
petition. Each firm produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate
good and have to buy a patented design before producing it. Following Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), Bucci (2003), Bucci (2005b) and Bucci (2005c),
we assume that each local intermediate monopolist has access to the same
technology employing only skilled labor hj :
xj = hj. (5)
5Benassy (1996) made a simple modification to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model
which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power. At the same time, Benassy
(1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998) show that the introduction of this modification in
an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety a` la Grossman and Helpman
(1991) affects the welfare analysis.
6Indeed, we obtain the Bucci (2003) model by introducing the following constraints
λ = α, γ = 1− α in our model.
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We suppose that firms behavior which produce intermediate goods is gover-
ned by the principle of profit maximization at given factor prices under a
technological constraint. The profit function of firms is the following :
pij = pjxj − wjhj, (6)
where wj is wage rate in the intermediate goods. Using the first order condi-
tion, we obtain the price of the jth intermediate good :
pj =
wj
α
, (7)
At the symmetric equilibrium, all the firms produce the same quantity of the
intermediate good, face the same wage rate and by consequence fix the same
price for their production. The price is equal to a constant mark up 1
α
−1 over
the marginal cost w. Defining by Hj =
∫ n
0
hjdj, the total amount of skilled
labor employed in the intermediate goods sector and under symmetry among
intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite the equation (5) as follows :
xj =
Hj
n
, (8)
Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the jth intermediate
good is
pij = Aλ(1− α)nγ−1Hλj H1−λy . (9)
2.3 The R&D sector
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. Following Bucci
(2003), Bucci (2005b) and Bucci (2005c), we assume that new blueprints are
produced using an amount of R&D skilled labor Hn :
n˙ = CHn, (10)
where C > 0 represents the productivity of the R&D process. Because of the
perfect competition in the R&D sector, we can obtain the real wage in this
sector as a function of the profit flows associated to the latest intermediate
in using the zero profit condition :
wnHn = n˙Vn, (11)
where wn represents the real wage earned by R&D skilled labor. Vn is the
real value of such a blueprint which is equal to :
Vn =
∫ ∞
t
pije
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t, (12)
where r is the real interest rate. Given Vn, the free entry condition leads to :
wn = CVn. (13)
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2.4 The consumer behavior
The demand side is characterized by the representative household who
holds asset in the form of ownership claims on firm and chooses plans for
consumption (c), asset holdings (a) and human capital (h).7 Following Lucas
(1988), we assume that the household is endowed with one unit of time
and optimally allocates a fraction u of this time endowment to productive
activities (final good, intermediate goods and research production) and the
remaining fraction (1−u) to non productive activities (education). Following
Romer (1990), we assume that the utility function of this consumer is 8 :
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−θ − 1
1− θ dt, (14)
where c is private consumption, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference
and σ = 1
θ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The flow budget
constraint for the household is :
a˙ = wuh+ ra− c, (15)
where w is the wage rate per unit of labor services. The human capital supply
function is given by :
h˙ = δ(1− u)h, (16)
where δ > 0 is a parameter reflecting the productivity of the education
technology. From the maximization program of the consumer,9 the first order
conditions are :
λ1 = c
−θe−ρt, (17)
−λ˙1 = λ1r, (18)
−λ˙2 = λ1wu+ λ2δ(1− u), (19)
λ1 = λ2
δ
w
. (20)
Equation (17) gives the discounted marginal utility of consumption which
satisfies the dynamic optimality condition in equation (18). Equation (20)
7Like Bucci (2003), Bucci (2005b) and Bucci (2005c), for the sake of simplicity, we
assume that there is no population growth.
8This specification of the utility function is a generalization of the Bucci (2003), Bucci
(2005b) and Bucci (2005c) models. Indeed, these authors use a utility function which is
logarythmic.
9The control variables of this problem are c et u whereas a and h are the state variables.
λ1 et λ2 denote the shadow price of the household’s asset holdings and human capital stock.
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gives the static optimality condition for the allocation of time. The marginal
cost of an additional unit of skills devoted to working evolves optimally as in
equation (19). Conditions (17) trough (20) must satisfy the constraints (15
and 16), together with the transversality conditions :
lim
t→∞
λ1tat = 0, (21)
lim
t→∞
λ2tht = 0. (22)
3 The equilibrium and the steady state
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical
characterization of a balanced growth path.
3.1 The equilibrium
It is now possible to characterize the skilled labor market equilibrium in
the economy considered. On this market, because of the homogeneity and the
perfect mobility across sectors, the arbitrage ensures that the wage rate that
is earned by salaries which work in the final good sector, intermediate goods
sector or R&D sector is equal. As a result, the following three conditions
must simultaneously be satisfied :
u∗H = HY +Hj +Hn, (23)
wj = wy, (24)
wj = wn. (25)
Equation (23) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the time
the sum of the skilled labor demands coming from each activity must be equal
to the total available supply. Equation (24) and equation (25) state that the
wage earned by one unit of skilled labor is to be the same irrespective of the
sector where that unit of skilled labor is actually employed.
We can characterize the product market equilibrium in the economy consi-
dered. Indeed, on this market, the firms produce a final good which can be
consumed. Consequently, the following condition must be satisfied :
Y = C. (26)
Equation (26) is a resource constraint on the final good sector.
We can describe the capital market equilibrium in our economy. Because the
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total value of the household’s assets must be equal to the total value of firms,
the following condition must be checked :
a = nVn, (27)
where Vn is given by the equation (12) and satisfies the following asset pricing
equation :
V˙n = rVn − pij, (28)
3.2 The steady state
At the steady state, all variables as Y , c, n, a, H,10 HY , Hj, Hn grow at
a positive constant rate.
Proposition 1 If u is constant then all the other variables grow at strictly
positive rates with
gH = gHY = gHj = gHn = gn, (29)
gY = gc = (γ + 1)gn = (γ + 1)ga, (30)
Proof. From the equilibrium on the skilled labor market, given by the equa-
tion (23), it easy to show that gH = gHY = gHj = gHn if u is constant. From
the definition of the firm research process, given by the equation (10), we ob-
tain that gn = gHn. Now, if we combine the two last equations, we obtain the
equation (29). From the equilibrium on the product market, given by the equa-
tion (26), it easy to find that gY = gc. The equation (27) implies that ga = gn.
By substituting equation (8) into equation (1), then by log-differentiating the
equation (1), we obtain gY = (γ+1)gn. By combining the previous equations,
we find the equation (30).
10Given the assumptions on the size of the representative household and the population
growth rate, h ≡ H which implies that we can use gH instead of gh.
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Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady
state equilibrium values for the relevant variables of the model11 :
r = δ +
γ(δ − ρ)
γ(θ − 1) + θ , (31)
Hj =
nαδ
C(1− α) , (32)
HY =
nδ(λ− 1)
C(α− 1)λ, (33)
Hn =
n(δ − ρ)
C(γ(θ − 1) + θ) , (34)
u∗ =
(γ + 1)δ(θ − 1) + ρ
δ(γ(θ − 1) + θ) , (35)
gH = gHY = gHj = gHn = gn =
δ − ρ
γ(θ − 1) + θ , (36)
gY = gc = (γ + 1)gn = (γ + 1)ga =
(γ + 1)(δ − ρ)
γ(θ − 1) + θ . (37)
According to the equation (31), the real interest rate (r) is constant. Equation
(32), (33) and (34) give the amount of skilled labor in each sector at the
equilibrium. Equation (35) represents the optimal and constant fraction of
the household’s time endowment that it will decide to devote to work (u∗) in
equilibrium. Equation (36) states that the growth rate of human capital and
the innovation activity are equal and depend on technological and preference
parameters (δ, γ, θ and ρ). Equation (37) shows that the growth rate is a
function of technological and preference parameters (δ, γ, θ and ρ).
4 The relationship between product market
competition and growth
In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition
and growth in the model presented above. Following most authors, we use
the so-called Lerner Index to gauge the intensity of market power within a
market. Such an index is defined by the ratio of price (P ) minus marginal
cost (Cm) over price. Using the definition of a mark up (Markup= P
Cm
) and
Lerner Index (LernerIndex=P−Cm
P
), we can use (7) to define a proxy of
11Results (31) trough (37) are demonstrated in the appendix.
8
competition as follows12 :
(1− LernerIndex) = α, (38)
We show that our simple generalization of Bucci (2003)’s model that
consists in having the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sec-
tor, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to
specialization treated separately, in order to have a better measurement of
competition, the competition has no impact on growth.
Proposition 2 The competition has no effect on growth for all positive va-
lues of ρ, η, L and γ, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is obtained by differentiating (37) with respect to α :
∂gY
∂α
= 0. (39)
This result is clearly explained by the fact that economic growth rate
only depends on the parameters describing preference and the human capital
accumulation technology but is completely independent of competition and
RD activity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a generalization of production function of
Bucci (2003) which disentangles the monopolistic mark-up in the interme-
diate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the
returns to specialization in order to have a better measurement of compe-
tition. Our main finding is that the result of his model depends critically
on the assumptions that there are no differences between these three para-
meters. Indeed, for all values of parameters except to γ = 1 − α, we could
remove the effect of competition on growth.
12This is the same measure of product market competition used by Bucci (2003), Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), Aghion and Griffith (2005), Aghion and Ho-
witt (2005), Bucci (2005a) and Bucci (2005b), Bucci (2005c) and Bianco (2007), contrary
to Bucci and Parello (2006) which link the competition to two components : the input
shares in income and the parameter of substitution between intermediates.
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Appendix
In these appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the
main results of this paper (31 through 37). Consider the representative consu-
mer’s problem (equations (14) through (23) in the main text), whose the first
order conditions are stated in equations (17) through (23) with consumer’s
constraints and transversality conditions, we have :
λ1 = c
−θe−ρt, (40)
−λ˙1 = λ1r, (41)
−λ˙2 = λ1wu+ λ2δ(1− u), (42)
λ1 = λ2
δ
w
. (43)
a˙ = ra+ wuh− c, (44)
h˙ = δ(1− u)h, (45)
lim
t→∞
λ1tat = 0, (46)
lim
t→∞
λ2tht = 0. (47)
Combining equations (43) and (42), we obtain :
λ˙2
λ2
= −δ. (48)
From equation (41), we get :
λ˙1
λ1
= −r. (49)
Equation (43) implies that :
λ˙1
λ1
=
λ˙2
λ2
− gw. (50)
Combining equations (48), (49) and (50), we obtain :
r = δ + gw. (51)
In the balanced growth path equilibrium, the growth rate of the wage ac-
cruing to human capital (gw) is constant (see later on this appendix). This
implies that the real interest rate (r) will be also constant. With a constant
real interest rate and using the equation (9), the equation (12) becomes :
Vnt = Aλ(1− α)Bλ
∫ ∞
t
nγ−1τ H
λ
jτH
1−λ
Y τ e
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t. (52)
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In order to compute the market value of one unit of research output at time
t (Vnt) along the balanced growth path equilibrium, we use the following
equations :
nτ = nte
gnt, (53)
Hjτ = Hjte
gHj t, (54)
HY τ = HY te
gHY t. (55)
(56)
Inserting equations (53), (54) and (55) into equation (52), and after some
calculations, we get :
Vnt =
Aλ(1− α)nγ−1(BHj)λH1−λY
r − (γ − 1)gn − (1− λ)gHY − λgHj
. (57)
Such result is obtained under the assumption that r > (γ − 1)gn − (1 −
λ)gHY −λgHj . In a moment, we will demonstrate that this hypothesis (which
assures that Vnt is positive for each t) is always checked along the balanced
growth path equilibrium. Given Vnt and making use of equation (13) in the
main text, we get :
wn =
CAλ(1− α)nγ−1(BHj)λH1−λy
(r − (γ − 1)gn − (1− λ)gHY − λgHj)
. (58)
From equations (4) and (8), we get the value of the wage rate accruing to
human capital employed in the final good sector :
wY = (1− λ)AH−λY nγBλHλj . (59)
From equations (3), (7) and (8), we get the value of the wage rate accruing
to human capital in the intermediate goods sector :
wj = αλAH
1−λ
Y n
γBλHλ−1j . (60)
Combining equations (40) and (41), we are able to obtain the usual Euler
equation, giving the optimal household’s consumption path :
gc =
r − ρ
θ
. (61)
From the equation above, we clearly see that r must be greater than ρ and
in the same time θ > 0 in order to have gc positive. From equation (27) and
using equation (57), we get :
ga = gn + gVn = gn + (γ − 1)gn + λgHj + (1− λ)gHY . (62)
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Using equations (29), we can rewrite the equation (62) as follows :
ga = (γ + 1)gn. (63)
From equations (44) and (49), we have :
λ˙1
λ1
= −ga + uwh
a
− c
a
. (64)
Using equations (45) and (48), we get :
λ˙2
λ2
= −gh − uδ. (65)
Equations (58), (59) and (60) together also imply that :
gwn = gwj = gwY = gw = γgn. (66)
From equations (63), (64) (65) and (66), we obtain :
c
a
= δu+ uw
h
a
. (67)
Using equation (63) and equation (66) and knowing that u is constant at
the equilibrium, equation (67) leads to the conclusion that c
a
is constant. In
other words :
gc = ga = (γ + 1)gn. (68)
Plugging equation (68) into equation (61), we get :
r = θ(γ + 1)gn + ρ. (69)
Equating equation (51) and equation (69) yields :
gw = δ − ρ− θ(γ + 1)gn. (70)
Now, equating equation (66) and equation (70), we get the growth rate of n
along the balanced growth path equilibrium :
gn =
δ − ρ
θ(γ + 1)− γ . (71)
Given gn, it is now possible to compute the real interest by using equations
(51) and (66) :
r = δ +
γ(δ − ρ)
γ(θ − 1) + θ , (72)
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Combining equations (26) and (68), we get the growth rate :
gY = gc = (γ + 1)gn = (γ + 1)ga =
(γ + 1)(δ − ρ)
γ(θ − 1) + θ , (73)
From the equation (29), we obtain the growth rate of human capital :
gH = gHY = gHj = gHn = gn =
δ − ρ
γ(θ − 1) + θ , (74)
Equating (58) and (59) by using (69) and (71), we get the skilled labor
allocated in the final good sector :
HY =
nδ(λ− 1)
C(α− 1)λ, (75)
Equating (58) and (60) by using (69) and (71), we get the skilled labor
allocated in the intermediate goods sector :
Hj =
nαδ
C(1− α) , (76)
Combining equations (10) and (71), we get the skilled labor allocated in the
research good sector :
Hn =
n(δ − ρ)
C(γ(θ − 1) + θ) , (77)
Combining equations (48), (65) and (74), we obtain the time spending in
production :
u∗ =
(γ + 1)δ(θ − 1) + ρ
δ(γ(θ − 1) + θ) .
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